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The Chilean response to COVID-19 has adopted two approaches: first, the use of
emergency powers; and second, the use of ordinary legislation and constitutional
amendment. Among the measures imposed under the constitutional state
of exception, two measures are highly questionable: (1) a national overnight
curfew, and (2) a heavily-policed use of identity control. Through a constitutional
amendment, the 2020 electoral calendar has been modified, delaying the most
important political event of the year: the April referendum for a new constitution.
While the postponement is reasonable considering the current sanitary situation,
recent suggestions that there be a further postponement due to a possible post-
pandemic economic crisis threaten the democratic legitimacy of the process. As
argued in this post, these measures and opinions, when read together, put the
government close to an authoritarian use of the constitution.
We cannot understand this claim without considering the prior state of civil unrest
in Chile. Briefly, the protests which began against price hikes in public transport
rapidly turned against the extreme social inequality present in contemporary
neoliberal Chile. These public protests reached more than one million people in
Santiago on several occasions, with the last one taking place on the commemoration
of International Women’s day, in March. At the beginning of the protests, the
government decreed a state of emergency using the military to control the
population. During that time, and afterwards, serious human rights violations
have been committed by both the military and the police, including deaths,
torture, hundreds of eye mutilations and thousands of protesters injured, as some
international organisations have reported. Meanwhile, as a consequence of political
negotiations in the Parliament during the civil unrest, a national plebiscite about the
possibility of enacting a new constitution, and the kind of assembly responsible for its
drafting was scheduled for April 2020. This referendum was seen as an opportunity
to overcome the still present authoritarian norms of the Pinochet’s constitution; and
to give the Chilean people, for the first time in history, the power to make their own
constitution.
Chile’s Constitutional Framework
The Chilean Constitution belongs to those which have a comprehensive regulation
of emergency powers. This regulation includes not only what explicitly appears in the
Constitution (Articles 39 to 45), but also within a constitutional State of Exceptions
Act (the Ley Orgánica Constitucional de los Estados de Excepción) which
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provides further details and clarity to what is already stated by the Constitution.
The explicit constitutional framework has varied over time, from a conception of
states of exception as devices of dictatorship’s authoritarian constitutionalism to
a more democratic version, following constitutional reforms in 2005. Before this,
constitutional emergency powers were examples of what has been called “protected
democracy”, through the involvement of the “National Security Council” (NSC),
which has mainly composed by the military (Barros, 2002, pp. 36-37). Consequently,
democratically legitimate bodies (in this case, the President) were subjected to the
will of the military. After 2005, the NSC’s functions were reduced to a consultative
one, whereas Parliament’s role was expanded. Despite these changes, the States
of Exception Act which was enacted under the dictatorship, has not been modified
since 1990. The Dictator Pinochet modified the Act just before leaving power as
part of a strategy of constitutional abuse, which also involved other important
areas of regulation, making its democratic reform very difficult  (Atria, 2013, pp.
61-62). Nowadays, this unreformed act appears as outdated and unfocused on the
challenges of current emergencies. Finally, responding to the human rights violations
during the civil unrest, a new Presidential decree on the use of force by Armed
Forces during states of exception was promulgated. This decree has been fiercely
criticised however, due to its incompatibility with international human rights law.
The Constitution establishes four kinds of “states of exception”, equipped with
distinctive emergency powers and rights’ limitations in each case. To that extent,
it closely follows the trend in Latin American Constitutions (Gross & Aoláin, 2006,
p. 42). Every case is based on a description of facts that can recommend the
declaration of emergency. The intensity of powers, the requirements before their
declaration, and the consequent degree of limitation of rights permitted are given
according to the gravity of the fact that justifies the state of exception.
In cases of “internal” or “external” war (estado de asamblea) and “severe internal
disturbance” (estado de sitio), the President requires Parliament’s approval, although
it can decree a provisional declaration in the meantime. Once enacted, it can allow
both the “suspension” and “restriction” of a list of rights (personal liberty, reunion,
work, association, privacy, and private property). The other two states of exceptions
are justified for other emergencies, namely, “severe alteration to the public order”
and “severe damage to national security” (estado de emergencia), and “public
calamity” (estado de catástrofe). The requirements for their declarations are less
strict than the previous ones and reflect the hyper-presidentialism that characterises
the Chilean political system. The President can declare them without Parliament’s
acquiescence for a certain period, but parliamentary approval is required for further
extension or use (in the Chilean model, there is no “supermajoritarian escalator” as
in Ackerman, 2006). Regarding the limitation of rights, in these low-level states of
exceptions only the “restriction” of some rights is authorised (movement, freedom
of assembly, private property). It is worth considering that in any case, the courts
can review emergency measures, but the declaration of the state of exception itself
cannot be subjected to judicial review, according to the Constitution. Parliamentary
control is applied in two ways, either through the rejection of the declaration of every
state of exception, or through its general oversight powers.
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Application of Emergency Powers during COVID-19:
Threat of the “Normalisation of the Exception”
As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Executive first engaged general
sanitary powers allocated to the Health Department (dictating “sanitary alerts”).
On March 18th, the President declared an estado de catástrofe with a sunset
clause of 90 days, activating its constitutional emergency powers, through a
Presidential Decree. Arguably, the most concrete measures (including lockdown,
border control, sanctions for positive-tested people who infringe rules) applied on
behalf of the state of exception are acknowledged as necessary and reasonable.
Notwithstanding, two measures stand out due to the potential that they strengthen
the authoritarian approach still present in Chilean constitutionalism. First, through a
Health Department Resolution, a national overnight curfew (toque de queda) was
imposed without an end date. Second, the military official in charge of the state of
exception in Santiago informed the press of the introduction of widespread identity
controls in the zone.
Both controversial measures are justified on the argument that these measures are
included within the constitutional emergency powers and are truly necessary to deal
with the pandemic. By so doing, a “compulsion of legality” (Dyzenhaus, 2008, p. 39)
appears in the Executive’s discourse. However, the suitability of these measures to
fulfil the goal of sanitary precaution is dubious, as they seem to become devices of
general social control, going far beyond the other widely accepted measures that
have been applied so far.
As these measures are not strictly necessary to deal with the pandemic, they seem
to be the mere continuation of governmental attempts to curb civil unrest and repress
protesters. Particularly in the case of the overnight curfew, its application over the
entire population is a step forward in the “normalisation of the exception”, whereby
stronger restrictions are accommodated into the regular legal system (Gross, 2018).
A pernicious consequence of this strategy is that whenever a further difficult situation
emerges (concretely, when the pandemic disappears and the massive protests
return to Chilean cities), it will be easier for the government to upgrade to a higher
level of state of exception, however an overreaction and unjustified. From the point
of view of ordinary people, both suspension of rights and even repression of citizen
protests will appear more normal than before. In that sense, the recurrent phrases
of Chile’s President that the government is fighting a “war” – first against protesters,
now against the pandemic – can be read as attempts to normalise the use of higher
levels of public force. Considering the Chilean constitutional debate and current
socio-political scenario, these measures strengthen an authoritarian conception of
the constitution, by restricting freedoms and generating fear into the population.
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A Constitutional Amendment to deal with COVID-19:
Postponement of the Referendum on a New
Constitution
The Congress has passed several acts able to deal with different consequences
triggered by the pandemic, in areas such as social security, criminal indult,  judicial
processes, economic support for small and middle companies, working from home,
and the extension of several public documents. In addition, two constitutional
reforms have taken place because of COVID-19: the authorisation of electronic
attendance and vote in parliamentary sessions (ruling that the vote of MPs must be
personal, substantiated and non-delegable); and the deferral of the most remarkable
political fact of this year: the referendum for a new constitution (the “national
plebiscite”).
A Constitutional Amendment postpones the date for the referendum, from April 26th
to October 25th, 2020. Because of this change, the complete electoral calendar
of this year was altered: elections of mayors and local councils as well as the first
election of regional governors were rescheduled to April 11th, 2021.
This referendum is crucial to overcome the authoritarian legacy that Pinochet and his
supporters imposed through the 1980’s Constitution. Despite subsequent reforms
that have removed some of its foundations, authoritarian constitutionalism is still
present in the constitutional text and practice. The hope is that if the demand for a
new constitution is successful, the new constitutional draft agreed by the constituent
assembly will earn democratic legitimacy through ratification in a further referendum
(called “constitutional plebiscite”). Additionally, the new constitution will probably
leave behind the authoritarian devices that still impede the realisation of the popular
will.
Despite its capital importance, all political forces considered necessary to defer
this national plebiscite, to a date when the circumstances will not require a general
quarantine. This decision was correct, for two kind of reasons. Firstly, due to the
sanitary context, considering the likely insufficiency of measures to protect the health
and even the life of the electorate (IIDH/CAPEL, 2020). Secondly, the decision
protects the democratic credentials of the constituent process initiated in 2019. As
it is not possible to gather anymore once the estado de catástrofe was enacted, the
political campaign was inevitably suspended. Massive demonstrations in favour of a
new constitution have stopped. Therefore, the required space for deliberation in the
referendum campaign seems unachievable in this context. Additionally, considering
the insufficiency of sanitary measures, high levels of abstention would result if it is
not postponed.
However, Chilean political forces should not confuse these arguments with partisan-
related reasons for postponing the ballots, particularly the referendum for a new
constitution. In the last few days, the President has suggested that the national
plebiscite may be deferred again, arguing that this decision could be advisable
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not only if the pandemic persists, but for the occurrence of an expected post-
pandemic economic crisis (although days after the head of the Home Office
Department reaffirmed the arranged calendar). These kinds of comments threaten
the democratic legitimacy of the process and strengthen the authoritarian side
of Chilean constitutionalism who would like to undermine the first participatory
constitution-making in Chilean history.
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